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1. Introduction
There has been considerable recent debate on the topic of adversariality in argumentation. On the
one hand, it has been argued that argumentation is, by its nature, adversarial in that it involves a
confrontation between arguers arguing opposing positions, and, further, that such a confrontation
of opposing views is essential for arriving at the best judgments. On the other hand, some theorists
have pointed out that such an adversarial framing can be problematic in terms of encouraging
aggressive modes of discourse that can interfere with rational exchange. In addition, the imperative
to win that is inherent in adversarial argumentation may well eclipse the goal of coming to a
reasoned judgment, undermining co-operation, open-mindedness, and a willingness to concede to
the strongest reasons.
Although there has been a growing interest in adversariality in argumentation theory, this
debate has rarely found its way into work on critical thinking theory and instruction. 1 The issue
addressed in this paper is: how does this debate apply to critical thinking? Is there a role for
adversariality and adversarial argumentation in education for critical thinking?

2. The educational project

1

One work that deals with the issue of adversariality in critical thinking instruction is Catherine Hundleby’s (2010)
discussion of problems with the adversary paradigm in the teaching of fallacies.
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In order to tackle the issue of the role of adversariality in critical thinking instruction, it is necessary,
first, to establish what the goals are of critical thinking instruction. We have argued elsewhere
(Bailin & Battersby, 2016a) that the primary goal of critical thinking instruction should be to
develop in people the ability and the habits of mind or virtues relevant to making reasoned
judgments on significant issues, often of a complex nature, and to engage in reasoned interchange
and dialogue.
There are a number of contexts in which this goal is central:
i.

ii.
iii.

Individual inquiry and decision-making: making judgments and decisions about issues and
controversies which people encounter, for example political issues (Should our country
accept more refugee claimants? For whom shall I vote?); social issues (Should there be
physician-assisted dying? Should assault rifles be banned?); scientific issues (Should you
have your children vaccinated? Is GMO food safe?). This would include making judgments
about arguments one reads and written back and forth argumentation.
Group deliberation: engaging in deliberation and making judgments and decisions in group
situations, for example in juries and in educational, professional and community contexts
Persuasion: in person argumentation between two or more individuals trying to persuade
the others of the rightness of their position.

All these contexts require the capacity to critically evaluate reasons and arguments on
various sides of issues as well as the habits of mind or virtues necessary for doing so in an openminded and fair-minded way. In addition, cases ii) and iii) require the ability and propensity to
engage in rational and productive dialogue, to make a reasonable case with the appropriate level
of confidence, to listen to the arguments of others, and to modify or change one’s position when
warranted by the arguments. All these contexts involve a consideration of conflicting views. Thus
questions regarding the role of adversariality are relevant to all of them.
3. The adversariality debate
3.1 Pro adversariality
3.1.1 Argumentation is by its nature adversarial
Theorists on one side of the debate argue that argumentation is by its nature adversarial in that it
involves a confrontation between arguers arguing opposing positions (Govier, 1999). As Govier
states:
It would appear that in any controversy there must be proponents and opponents of various
views. Insofar as we are engaged in a controversy, we will be arguing with others who
disagree with us and are, in that sense at least, our opponents or antagonists. (p. 247)
Govier further claims that argumentation involves the belief that the opposing position is mistaken
and that this, in turn, entails the belief that the person holding the opposing position is wrong, and
that, with respect to the correctness of the position, they are one’s opponent (Govier, 1999, p. 244).
Aikin (in a 2011 paper) supports this oppositional framing, maintaining that we argue with others
because we believe that our views are correct and theirs are not and that those who disagree with
our views are wrong and need correction (Aikin, 2011). Indeed, numerous theorists have pointed
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out the ubiquity of this adversarial paradigm in philosophy (Moulton, 1983) and in argumentation
more generally (Cohen, 2015). Casting the participants in argumentation in the roles of proponent
and opponent with the goal of prevailing in the argument is a common way of framing the practice.
3.1.2 Epistemic advantages of adversariality
The argument is not, however, simply that argumentation is, by nature, an adversarial practice. It
is argued, further, that this adversarial practice has epistemic advantages—that such a
confrontation of opposing views is essential for arriving at the best judgments. Zarefsky, for
example, argues that the prospect of prevailing in an argument motivates people to produce
stronger reasons than they would on their own (Zarefsky, 2012). And Aikin makes the point thus:
it is in the enacting of the debates, the attempts by each side’s proponents to make the best
case, rebut the opponent’s counter-arguments, and lay out the best criticisms of the
alternatives that we gain an understanding of an issue (Aikin, 2011, p. 260).
The argument is that the rigorous debate at the heart of adversarial argumentation results
in the laying out for consideration of the best case for opposing views, the strongest objections and
counter-arguments, and the most forceful rebuttals. This makes it more likely that the bestsupported view will prevail.
There is, in fact, considerable support for the view that the consideration of alternative
views and opposing arguments is crucial for coming to reasoned judgments (Finocchiaro, 1994;
Perkins, 1989; Perkins et al., 1983). Such a consideration of alternatives is important because fully
evaluating a theory or view is a comparative enterprise, requiring the weighing of evidence and
arguments for and against the various alternative views (Bailin & Battersby, 2009, 2016a; Kuhn,
1991). Evaluation, as Kuhn argues, is meaningful only in a framework of comparison (pp. 266267). In this context, the generation of counter-examples and counter-arguments is indispensable
as it plays a crucial role in the evaluating of one’s own views in comparison with alternative views
and allows for the revision of existing beliefs (Kuhn, 1991). Kuhn again: “Paradoxically, to know
that a theory is correct entails the ability to envision and address claims that it may not be” (p. 171).
There is also considerable evidence, however, that individuals, on their own, are generally
not very good at generating opposing arguments and considering opposing views. Much current
research in cognitive psychology has demonstrated the ubiquity of myside bias, involving a failure
to consider alternatives and to fairly and adequately evaluate arguments with which one disagrees
(Perkins, 1989; Perkins, Farady, & Bushey, 1991; Perkins & Tishman, 2001; Stanovich, 2011). It
appears that people are generally much better at evaluating and critiquing the arguments of others
than they are at evaluating their own reasoning. They tend, for example, to have a limited ability
to come up with arguments against positions that they hold and in generating counter-examples to
their own views (Mercier, 2016; Mercier & Sperber, 2017):
When people reason on their own, they mostly find reasons that support their preexisting
beliefs (myside bias), and they are not critical toward these reasons (laziness). As a result,
they are unlikely to revise their own beliefs, whether or not these beliefs are accurate
(Mercier, Boudry, Paglieri & Trouche, 2017, p. 6).
It is through the practice of argumentation, however, that these tendencies can be countered.
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Thanks to reasoning, senders can provide arguments to support their messages, arguments
that can be evaluated by receivers so they can decide whether to accept the message. By
discussing and evaluating one another’s arguments, people may end up accepting a point of
view that they initially deemed implausible or unpalatable (Lombardi, Nussbaum, & Sinatra
2015). (Mercier, Boudry, Paglieri & Trouche, 2017, p. 5)
The epistemic benefits of argumentation are borne out by the success of some forms of
group deliberation. Groups, properly constituted, tend to be much better at making reasoned
judgments than individuals, group members compensating for each other’s limitations and
correcting each other’s cognitive biases (Mercier, 2016; Mercier & Sperber, 2017). Such benefits
only accrue in groups in which there is a confrontation of conflicting views and in which
participants feel free to express those views and critique the views of others. Group deliberation
in which there is a lack of disagreement or a reluctance to express differing views can result in the
amplification of errors, the reinforcement of existing beliefs, and an increase in commitment to
poor decisions (Janis,1982; Schultz-Hardt et al., 2000, 2006; Sunstein & Hastie, 2015).
What the pro adversariality view rightly highlights is the epistemic value of disagreement
and the importance of mutual critique.
3.2 Problems of Adversariality
3.2.1 Aggressive modes of discourse
The adversarial framing of argumentation also presents some risks, however. One of these relates
to the modes of discourse it encourages. Numerous theorists have criticized the dominance of battle
and sports metaphors in argumentation and the type of aggressive discourse which it can engender
(Ayim, 1991; Blair, 1987; Cohen 1995; Govier 1999; Hundleby, 2013; Lakoff & Johnson, 1980;
Moulton, 1989; Rooney, 2010). These modes of discourse may exclude women and socially
marginalized groups (Ayim, 1991; Moulton, 1989; Tannen, 1998) and can interfere with
reasonable and productive interactions and with rational exchange (Hundleby, 2013, p. 240).
It has been argued, however that adversarial argumentation need not result in aggressive
modes of interaction. Govier refers to such behaviours as ancillary adversariality and suggests
that it is not a necessary part of argumentation. Adversariality can, she argues, be kept to a logical
and polite minimum (Govier, 1999), a type of adversariality which she calls minimal adversariality.
3.2.2 Oppositional framing
The proposal for minimal adversariality, although it does address the issue of aggressive language
and modes of interacting, is nonetheless problematic in accepting the framing of the enterprise in
terms of opponents and winning. Govier states, for example, “When we argue for a claim, we at
the same time, and necessarily, argue against an envisioned opponent, one who does not accept
the claim” (p. 243).
This slide from “arguing for claims” to “arguing against people who disagree with those
claims” is problematic. Moreover, viewing the person holding the opposing position as one’s
opponent is unnecessary and unjustified, as Rooney points out: “[W]hy are you my “opponent” if
you are providing me with further or alternative considerations in regard to X . . . whether I end
up agreeing with X or not-X?” (Rooney, 2010, p. 221).
Govier herself, in fact, recognizes the difficulty inherent in this oppositional terminology:

4

If we accept that there is a positive value in controversy . . . then what reason is there to
regard those who participate with us in controversy as opponents or antagonists with whom
we are in conflict? Given all the positive aspects of controversy, there is an important sense
in which such people are helping us by disagreeing with us. Thus we might wish to regard
them as partners, not opponents (p. 254).
A related issue has to do with the effect of this contest metaphor on the goal of epistemic
improvement. We have seen the argument made by some theorists (Aikin, 2011; Zarefsky, 2012)
that adversariality, with its accompanying desire to win the argument, contributes to epistemic
goals. Yet in practice the opposite result is often the case. The imperative to win the argument may
conflict with the desire to have the best view win out, thereby eclipsing the goal of coming to a
reasoned judgment, undermining co-operation, open-minded consideration of opposing arguments,
and a willingness to concede to the strongest reasons and to revise or change one’s view if
warranted by the evidence.
If the argument is that having each party make the strongest case they can for their own
position will result in epistemic advance, then the question arises: to whom do the epistemic gains
accrue? If each of the arguers is committed to winning rather than to making a reasoned judgment,
then it would fall to a third party or parties (an audience) to evaluate the arguments and make the
reasoned judgment (as is the case in a courtroom or traditional debate). Unless the arguers are open
to a fair-minded consideration of the opposing views and are willing to revise or change their
position if warranted, the epistemic gains will not accrue to them.
In this context, Rooney has pointed out that the framing of the argumentative enterprise in
terms of winning and losing is, in fact, an inaccurate and misleading description. If our interlocutor
offers a better argument for their position than we offer for ours and we accept that argument, we
don’t in fact lose. We actually gain. We are, epistemically speaking, better for it.
Another problem with the adversariality view is its binary framing of argumentation.
Cohen maintains that such a framing can interfere with our rational goals since it tends to
presuppose that:
the subject at hand can be carved into distinct and opposing positions, and this tends to
squeeze the discussion of even the most complex questions into a black-and-white view of
the world. (Cohen, 1995, pp. 180-181)
Argumentation is not, however, a binary affair. Argumentation is dialectical, involving an
interaction between arguers and arguments. Particular arguments are often modified or reframed
in response to criticism and objections, and these modifications may in turn result in a revision of
the objections, a modification of the criteria deemed relevant, and even a reframing of the original
question (Bailin & Battersby 2009). The kind of richer, deeper understanding of an issue that can
come out of a confrontation of views is less likely to arise when such a dialectical dimension is
lacking.
The paradigm of argumentation which is the focus of the adversariality debate tends to be
two person face-to-face persuasive argumentation. In practice, however, argumentation takes place
in a variety of other contexts and is structured in various ways, from formally structured contexts
such as traditional debates and courtroom argumentation, to an individual deliberating about an
issue, several people inquiring together in a collaborative group, and individuals with differing
views trying to make a judgment.

5

It is important to keep in mind, however, that, regardless of how argumentation may be
structured in particular contexts, the underlying goal is the making of reasoned judgments. There
are variations in how this goal is cashed out by different theorists -- to yield knowledge or
reasonable belief (Biro & Siegel, 1997, 2006), to lead to rationally justified belief (Lumer, 2005),
the bettering of our belief systems (van Radziewsky, 2013), epistemic betterment (Stevens &
Cohen, 2019). We prefer to characterize this goal in terms of coming to reasoned judgments,
making it clear that this includes judgments about what to do as well as about what to believe
(Bailin & Battersby, 2009, 2016a). Arguers may come to an argument with various initial
intentions including, but not limited to, wanting to persuade their interlocutor of a different view.
But so long as they are engaging in a reasoned exchange of arguments, are open to seriously
considering alternative arguments, and are willing to follow the reasoning where it leads and to
alter their own position accordingly, they are involved in a joint endeavour and are not opponents
(Bailin & Battersby, 2009, 2016b).
3.2.3 Polarization
Another potential risk posed by adversarial argumentation is polarization. Although the
confrontation of conflicting views can result in the serious consideration of opposing views and
counter-arguments and can enhance the making of reasoned judgments, it does not always reap
such epistemic benefits. The problem is not simply that individuals are often unmoved by cogent
opposing arguments and counter-arguments (Lord, Ross & Lepper, 1979. The process of defending
one’s position against counter-arguments and counter-evidence often creates a backfire effect, with
individuals becoming even more entrenched in their original positions (Bail et al., 2018; Kahan,
2013; Lord, Ross & Lepper, 1979; Sloman & Fernbach, 2017). One possible explanation for this
phenomenon is in terms of defensive bias: people tend to identify with their beliefs and so are
motivated to protect their beliefs as a way of protecting their feelings of adequacy and self-worth
(Cohen, Bastardi, Sherman, McGoey & Ross, 2007; Sherman & Cohen, 2002).
Another explanation is in terms of cultural cognition which involves individuals holding
onto specific beliefs as a way of expressing their group identity and solidarity with others and so
resisting information and evidence that go against the dominant beliefs within their group (van
Bavel & Pereira, 2018; Kahan, 2013; Kahan, Jenkins-Smith & Braman, 2011). The framing of
those who hold opposing views as one’s opponent, as, indeed, the “enemy” is an all too common
manifestation of this problem. And it is a problem which occurs not only in face-to-face
argumentation but also when people hear, read, or come across arguments (e.g., in the media)
which disagree with the views they hold. Indeed, Haidt has argued that it is virtually impossible to
persuade others under conditions of group competition (Haidt, 2012).
4. What can we learn from the debate?
There are a number of lessons that can be learned from the discussion of adversariality that are
applicable to education for critical thinking. The debate reveals some aspects of adversarial
argument that contribute to epistemic improvement and that should be included in critical thinking
instruction as well as some aspects that can detract from the making of reasoned judgments and
that should be avoided.
4.1 Positive aspects
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One of the most important points to be taken from the debate is the centrality of the exposure to
opposing views for making reasoned judgments. The confrontation of conflicting views can help
counteract myside bias, helping people to see both sides of an issue, to acknowledge counterarguments, and to make better arguments and improved judgments and decisions (Mercier &
Sperber, 2017, p. 298). The debate also highlights the importance of getting actual, strong, and not
straw-person versions of these opposing views laid out for consideration.
Another lesson from the debate is the importance of critique. Given that we are generally
not very good at evaluating our own views, the evaluation of our arguments by “other minds” is
invaluable. The need to be accountable for our arguments can provide a motivation for exploring
criticisms and counter-arguments and for improving our own reasoning (Tetlock, 1992).
4.2 Negative aspects
There are a number of aspects of adversariality that need to be avoided, however. One of these is
the aggressive modes of discourse and of interacting that can accompany adversarial
argumentation (Govier’s ancillary adversariality). These have been aptly criticized by numerous
theorists as having no role in reasoned argumentation.
Also to be avoided is the focus on winning which is often a part of adversarial
argumentation and which can detract from a fair-minded consideration of opposing views. This
focus can engender or be accompanied by aggressive modes of discourse and interaction, but it
need not be, as Govier points out. What is required, instead, is an orientation which focuses on the
epistemic goals of argumentation, an approach which has as its goal reasoned judgments.
We also need to try to avoid or mitigate the kind of polarization and backfire effect which
can occur when individuals confront views which conflict with their own. What is required is an
approach which mitigates defensiveness in the face of challenges to one’s views and lessens the
effects of in-group identity on reasoning.
5. Adversariality and critical thinking instruction
The goal for critical thinking education is to incorporate the benefits of adversarial argumentation
while mitigating the problems. What is required, then, is an approach which encourages the
confrontation of opposing views but at the same time fosters an open-minded consideration of
these views.
The distinctions made by Stevens and Cohen (2019b) among several forms of
adversariality is helpful here. They distinguish between the adversarial attitude, the adversarial
stance, and the adversarial function. The adversarial attitude involves a focus on winning and
garnering any practical advantages that winning can provide, rather than on “getting it right” and
generating epistemic gains. The adversarial stance involves occupying roles that set people against
each other as adversaries or opponents, e.g., in law, politics, debates. The adversarial function
involving engaging in the ‘moves of critical probing’ (or task, as we have called them) (Bailin &
Battersby, 2016b) that are dialectically oppositional (Aikin, 2017) and that are necessary for
argumentation, for example formulating objections, raising questions. What is desirable is an
approach to critical thinking education that avoids the adversarial attitude but incorporates the
adversarial function. We will address the role of the adversarial stance later.
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5.1 Dialectical inquiry
Our response is an approach based on what we call dialectical inquiry. It is an approach which
focuses on a confrontation of opposing views but within a collaborative framework. In dialectical
inquiry, the goal is to come to a reasoned judgment on a controversial issue and this is viewed as
an essentially dialectical and collaborative process. Students work in groups to comparatively
evaluate arguments on all sides of an issue rather than simply offering and defending their own
arguments. Thus the exploration of conflicting views is at the centre of the inquiry process, but the
process of reaching a reasoned judgment is a collaborative rather than adversarial endeavour.
There are a number of features of dialectical inquiry which instantiate the desired elements
described above. First, aspects of the structure of the inquiry process ensure an exposure to
conflicting views. These include the requirement that students research the actual arguments that
have been presented on various of issues and not just those that they can think of on their own nor
straw-person versions that may have been offered by opponents of the view. A useful heuristic in
this regard is a dialectical argument table which represents the debate on the issue, including the
arguments pro and con as well as objections to the arguments and responses to the objections.
Through learning epistemic norms as well as considering the context of the debate, students are in
a position to come to a reasoned judgment through a comparative evaluation of the relative
strengths of the various arguments in the overall case.
Critique and the evaluation of one’s views and arguments by others are facilitated through
group deliberation and feedback. Indeed, the use of groups is an important aspect of the approach.
Students frequently engage in group interaction, discussing, questioning, challenging, and
critiquing. They engage in collaborative inquiries, jointly researching, evaluating, debating, and
coming to a joint judgment. They also engage in individual inquiries in which they conduct the
inquiry in stages, working in groups to get critique from peers at each stage. The discussion and
critique inherent in this process means that students will be exposed to objections to their positions
and critiques of their arguments. They will also become accustomed to offering well-grounded and
rigourous critiques of the views of others. Strategies for further promoting the inclusion of
conflicting views within the groups include creating heterogeneous groups, devil’s advocacy
(which can be effective although it tends to be less effective than real disagreement) (Schulz-Hardt,
Jochims & Frey, 2002; Schulz-Hardt et al., 2006), and structured controversy (where students
alternate in defending different sides of an issue and then collectively come to a reasoned
judgment) (Johnson & Johnson, 1988, 2009). The use of both devil’s advocacy and structured
controversy can be seen as ways of injecting a temporary adversarial stance into the argumentation
to ensure that the adversarial function is fulfilled. This can be particularly helpful in the case of
students who are reluctant to disagree with and critique the views of their peers. These strategies
can be an effective method for helping to mitigate the pitfalls of adversariality in group
argumentation (Johnson & Johnson, 1988, 2009) while encouraging accountability for one’s
arguments and ensuring that alternative views are given a full hearing and appropriate scrutiny.
It is not always possible, however, to have actual interlocutors and peer critics when
confronting controversial issues in life, as Baumtrog (2017) has pointed out. Thus one of the aims
is to set conditions that will encourage students to internalize the inquiry orientation. The intention
is that students will develop the habit of seeking out opposing arguments as well as objections and
critiques, and of evaluating them in a rigourous but fair-minded manner even when reasoning alone,
thus developing intellectual independence. In this regard, Mercier suggests:
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students should be taught how to create felicitous contexts for group discussion, thereby
allowing them both to reap the benefits of their argumentative skills and to improve on their
solitary reasoning skills. (Mercier, Boundry et al., 2017, p. 1)
According to Mercier, these felicitous conditions involve people in the group having different
opinions, being able to voice these opinions, and feeling free to criticize one another’s opinions
(Mercier et al., p. 8).
There is, in fact, considerable evidence that the epistemic benefits of group deliberation
carry over to the individual context. Kuhn, for example, found that students who had engaged in
argumentation with peers offered more complex arguments incorporating both sides of the issue
when writing individual essays on a different topic than did students who had been reasoning on
their own (Kuhn & Crowell, 2011). They also demonstrated an increased capacity to anticipate
counter-arguments in contexts when an interlocutor was not present and with respect to topics
beyond those discussed in the group (Mercier, 2017, p. 11).
The creation of a community of inquiry in the critical thinking class has an important role
to play in countering the adversarial attitude and in reducing polarization. This is a community in
which the epistemic goals of argumentation and the essentially collaborative nature of the
enterprise are emphasized. It is a community which instantiates the norms of critical inquiry,
promoting rigorous but respectful critique, including of one’s own views, open-minded and fairminded exchanges, and changing one’s mind when justified by the evidence and arguments. It is
also a community committed to respectful treatment, meaningful participation, and productive
interaction (Bailin & Battersby, 2017).
Such a community can mitigate defensive biases in that it is a community in which value
is placed not on supporting particular views but rather on being reasonable and in which students
feel free to revise their views. A community of inquiry can also help to address the challenges
posed by cultural cognition by creating a community of affiliation as an alternative to or counterbalance to one’s cultural community. In a community of inquiry, group identity is constituted not
by a commitment to specific beliefs but rather by adherence to the norms of rational inquiry.
A central point to be emphasized here is that critical thinking education aims not only to
develop the capacities for critical judgment, but also, and importantly, to foster the virtues of
inquiry. These include an appreciation of reason (Bailin & Battersby, 2007), a commitment to
reasoned discussion, and a commitment to rational belief and action (Siegel, 1988). The
collaborative, community orientation of the approach can work towards these aims.

6. Critiques
6.1 Doesn’t recognize virtuous adversariality
There are a number of critiques of our approach which would like to address in order to better
clarify our arguments and position. Stevens and Cohen (2019a) criticize our approach for its
alleged wholesale rejection of adversariality. They characterize our view as maintaining that there
is never any role for any form of adversariality in argumentation, that “each arguer in a cooperative
argument shares in the responsibility for fulfilling every [argumentative] task” (p. 2) and that a
virtuous arguer committed to the telos of epistemological betterment will “choose the cooperative
stance at each stage” (p. 2). The view they argue for, in contrast, is that arguments take place in a

9

variety of forms and contexts and that, depending on the situation, an arguer can choose an
adversarial rather than a cooperative stance out of argumentative virtue.
The claims they attribute to us, however, do not reflect our position. We explicitly make
the distinction between a perspective that focuses on argumentation as a social practice, and an
epistemological perspective, which focuses on the overall epistemic goals of argumentation. We
acknowledge that there are many contexts in which argumentation takes place and numerous ways
in which argumentation is structured in practice including formally structured contexts (e.g.,
courtroom, traditional debates), individuals trying to persuade others of their position (both in face
to face and in written contexts, e.g., social media), an individual deliberating about an issue, several
people inquiring together in a collaborative group, and individuals with differing views trying to
make a judgment. But we do not say anything about what choices particular arguers make, or
should make, in these various contexts or at different stages. Our focus is not on the particular
argumentative moves that arguers may make in specific situations but rather on their overall
orientation to the argumentative enterprise (although an epistemic, inquiry orientation would
preclude some moves, e.g., knowingly offering fallacious arguments or not conceding strong
points in one’s interlocutor’s arguments2). We would not disagree with their claim that “even the
virtuous arguer can be justified in adopting some degree of adversariality because of the context
of an argument and her role in it” (Stevens & Cohen, 2019a, p. 2)—as long as adversariality is
meant in the sense of the adversarial function. Our point is that in all of contexts, what needs to be
borne in mind is that the underlying goal is an epistemic one –arriving at a reasoned judgment (a
point with which they do not seem to disagree). So, for example, in the case of trying to persuade
another of one’s position, the interlocutors must be willing to acknowledge strong points in the
other’s arguments and modify their view when warranted by the reasons and arguments.
Nor do we claim that “each arguer in a cooperative argument shares in the responsibility
for fulfilling every task” (p. 2). Rather, our argument is that the various argumentative tasks (e.g.,
proposing arguments, offering objections, proposing counter-arguments, evaluating arguments)
may be performed by, shared among, and even switched between arguers depending on the context
and the situation, but that the division of labour is incidental from an epistemological perspective.
Moreover, their claim that we completely reject adversariality is misleading. Indeed, a
central aspect of our approach is that it is centred around the confrontation of conflicting views.
We do not reject what Stevens and Cohen have called the adversarial function. Rather, we have
made it a central aspect of the approach.
One of the underlying challenges with respect to clearly outlining our position is
terminological. Although we have argued for the importance of what Stevens and Cohen call the
adversarial function, we have reservations about using the term adversariality for the approach we
are advocating. Theorists have tried to modify it with various adjectives (e.g., minimal as opposed
to ancillary adversariality, dialectical adversariality) to divest it of its negative connotations. But
the need for such modifications reveals the essentially problematic character of the term in this
context. We think that a better description of what we are advocating might be “collaborative
oppositionality”—where oppositionality is used in the sense of “the state of being opposed by way
of comparison or contrast.” This captures the confrontation of opposing views without the negative
associations of the term adversariality and emphasizes the collaborative nature of the process. It is
2

Cf. Stevens and Cohen: “The attitude arguers have in an argument will impact their argumentative behavior. E.g.,
an arguer with a cooperative attitude will aim to act so that the arguers as a group will identify and correctly weigh
reasons applicable to the issue. By contrast, an arguer with an adversarial attitude will behave in those ways she
hopes will ultimately help her achieve her goal of winning” (Stevens & Cohen 2019b).
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similar to what Aikin (2017) calls “minimal dialectical adversariality” but avoids the problems of
adversariality and emphasizes the collaborative dimension.
6.2 Collaborative argumentation an unachievable ideal
The second critique by Stevens and Cohen that we want to address is that our goal of collaborative
argumentation is an unachievable ideal (2019b). Although agreeing that a cooperative stance may
be a normative ideal, they argue that the social context of argumentation, e.g., that arguers,
ourselves included, are flawed and that contexts are full of complex contingencies, make this ideal
unrealizable in practice. They claim that humans are combative and ineradicably susceptible to
adversarial attitudes and that “when we argue, we argue with others who bring their own
adversarial attitudes to arguments.” Because of these constraints and contingencies, the goal of
collaborative argumentation is unachievable, and our offering it as an argumentative ideal is
potentially harmful.
We certainly agree that the goal which we are putting forth, which we would characterize
in terms of collaborative oppositionality, is an ideal, but we do not see this as a criticism of the
approach. On the contrary, our interest is in education for critical thinking and education is, or
should be, animated by ideals. Ideals are what we aspire to, with full knowledge that they can
never be perfectly achieved. They provide the basis for the more proximate goals and give
substance to the virtues that we are aiming to develop. So, for example, we may see honesty as an
ideal to be aspired to and aim to foster the virtue of honesty in students even though we know that
they will not be perfectly honest in their lives, that their ability to practice honesty will not entirely
depend on them but will be affected by circumstances, and that they will encounter people who do
not act honestly and will try to take advantage of their honesty. Nonetheless, I do not think we
would see this as grounds for ceasing to see honesty as an ideal nor would we want to say that
trying to foster the virtue of honesty is harmful.
Moreover, we find their claim that “humans are combative and ineradicably susceptible to
adversarial attitudes” a rather sweeping and questionable generalization. There is evidence that
some individuals prefer cooperative over adversarial argumentation (Nussbaum, 2002). Moreover,
the success of collaborative group argumentation and deliberation would seem to indicate that
collaborative interaction can be fostered through appropriate group structures (i.e., groups where
there is a confrontation of conflicting views and in which people feel free to criticize other’s views
and to revise their own views) (Mercier et al., 2017). Such willingness to revise one’s views is
discouraged by an adversarial framing.
7. Conclusion
In trying to draw implications from the adversariality debate for critical thinking instruction, it is
important to note the differing focuses of two endeavours. The focus for the debate over
adversariality has largely been on two person face-to-face argumentation over a range of
subjects—from significant issues (e.g., whether to implement a carbon tax) to practical concerns
(e.g., who should walk the dog)—and on how people conduct and should conduct such arguments.
Our interest, in contrast, is on education for critical thinking. Thus our focus is on developing in
students the argumentation skills necessary for making reasoned judgments rather than on the
particular argumentative moves which arguers make in face-to-face argumentation. Our focus is
broader in including solitary reasoning and group deliberation – both of which are largely ignored
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or minimized in the debate. But it is also narrower in concentrating on contexts involving making
reasoned judgments (including judgments about what to do) rather than also including contexts
involving primarily negotiations (e.g., over who should walk the dog).
There are several lessons that we take from the debate that are relevant to our educational
project. One relates to the importance of the confrontation of conflicting views and of critique.
Another centres on the risks of aggressivity, of the focus on winning, and of polarization. What is
required, then, is an approach which involves the confrontation of opposing views but at the same
time fosters a critical but fair-minded consideration of these views. We propose dialectical inquiry,
with its use of collaborative oppositionality, as such an approach.
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